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INTRODUCTION 
The objectives of this paper are threefold. We initially review some of the key current 
debates regarding industrial relations in multinational companies (MNCs). We then 
consider the contribution of the so called INTREPID (Investigation of Transnationals' 
Employment Practices: an International Databaseii) study to these debates. Finally, we 
identify a number of industrial relations issues that remain to be addressed or further 
investigated, thus charting a form of research agenda for future work using the INTREPID 
database, with particular focus on the potential contribution from ‘second wave’ countries, 
namely Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Mexico and the Nordic area (Denmark and Norway).  
 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 
Aside conviction that home and host-country factors influence management practice in 
industrial relations within MNC subsidiaries, recent literature identifies the influence of 
organisational and structural characteristics of MNCs themselves in impacting on 
management practice, including that affecting industrial relations. This reinforces the need 
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to look beyond macro-institutional effects alone and include micro-organisational and 
MNC characteristics to develop an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the 
factors impacting on industrial relations practice and subsidiary level autonomy over 
industrial relations within MNCs. Furthermore, although broad qualitative research has 
been developed around management approaches to industrial relations on the one hand, 
and employee representatives’ perception of those practices on the other (cf. Marginson et 
al., 2004; Almond and Ferner, 2006; Waddington, 2010), in-depth quantitative analysis of 
factors shaping variation across subsidiary level is, to date, quite limited. The INTREPID 
database offers a unique opportunity to address these aspects. By drawing on an extensive 
international database, compiled from parallel surveys of employment practice in the 
operations of MNCs in ten European and non-European countries, it offers the basis for a 
robust analysis and understanding of industrial relations and its determinants within MNCs 
subsidiaries across borders.        
 
Two contrasting logics characterise much of the extant literature on MNCs and industrial 
relations. On the one hand, a long research tradition suggests that trade unions, employee 
representation structures and conventions are deeply embedded in national political 
economies, and that their institutions are so powerful that MNCs are forced to adapt to 
local traditions (e.g. collective bargaining, interaction with works councils) despite 
corporate preference to act otherwise for reasons related to perceived competitive 
advantage (Taylor et al., 1996; Whitley, 2001). On the other hand, the countervailing logic 
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is that MNCs operate in a manner which is “exogenous to national path dependencies” 
(Lamare et al., 2013: 695), and seek to deploy practices developed in different national 
contexts and/or utilise approaches which dilute the impact of local institutional pressures. 
Some empirical studies have shown how US MNCs in coordinated market economies 
manage to substantially insulate themselves from the influence of trade unions and sectoral 
bargaining (e.g. Royle, 1998; 2000). This suggests that MNCs are increasingly seeking to 
adapt bargaining processes and structures to their own needs and to consider national and 
sectoral collective bargaining as less relevant to their own employment practices. 
Furthermore they may increasingly compare themselves with other subsidiaries of their 
own company in other countries, or in - domestic or foreign - competitors (Arrowsmith 
and Marginson, 2006). One possible scenario is that in countries with multi-employer 
bargaining traditions and strong trade unions, MNCs will push for greater decentralization 
of collective bargaining and the concomitant freedom to negotiate their own employment 
practices with local unions, independently of national and sectoral dynamics, and to focus 
on the strengthening of their own competitiveness and adaptability (Marginson and Meardi, 
2009).  
 
Drawing from these various studies, which clearly illustrate some degree of autonomy in 
the way local (host country) management in MNC subsidiaries engage with local unions 
and their systems of collective representation, this paper highlights the need for additional 
empirical investigation of the factors influencing local management discretion over 
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employee representation and engagement. Of particular interest is the interaction between 
macro-institutional (e.g. country-of-origin effects, host-country characteristics) and 
organisational and structural firm-level factors (e.g. international human resource 
management [HRM] structure, management organisation, ownership and demographic 
factors). Specifically, we are interested in understanding how these two groups of features 
influence patterns of employee representation and the extent and form of engagement by 
local management in industrial relations in MNC subsidiaries.  
 
Much of extant literature on industrial relations in MNCs has focused on employee voice 
(cf. Boxall and Purcell, 2003). Lavelle et al. (2010: 396) define employee voice as “any type 
of mechanisms, structure or practice, which provides an employee with an opportunity to 
express an opinion or participate in decision-making within their organization”. Employee 
voice is usually operationalised into two broad categories, namely, direct voice and indirect 
voice. Direct voice is described as any communication mechanism acting as a vehicle for 
employees to improve their direct involvement in management decision making. This 
classification refers mainly to participation, consultation and information sharing. Indirect 
voice encompasses any mechanisms that provide employees with the channel for 
expressing their views via “some form of collective employee representation such as trade 
unions or non-union structures of collective representation (e.g. via consultative 
committees or work councils)” (Lavelle et al., 2010: 396). Since Freeman and Medoff 
(1984) profiled trade unions as key actors in the sphere of employee voice we find a lack of 
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consensus on this theme. Important manifestations of a shift in focus from trade unions 
and collective bargaining to other forms of employee voice include the progressive decline 
in trade unions density in countries with a strong trade union traditions and increased 
union avoidance, often based the principles of the welfare capitalism as developed in the 
US and often practiced by US MNCs abroad (Jacoby, 1997). Crucial questions remain as to 
the relative influence of macro- and micro-level effects on approaches to employee voice in 
MNC subsidiaries abroad. 
 
Institutionalism and MNCs 
Our starting point in investigating industrial relations within MNCs is a comparative 
institutionalism perspective which acknowledges that competitiveness in the international 
economic system is compatible with a wide range of national-institutional arrangements. 
Specifically, industrial and employment studies have centered on two contrasting 
propositions while examining the influence MNCs possess in shaping employment 
practices. Scholars drawing from the salience of different ‘national business systems’ 
(Whitley, 1999), point to strong national effects on local employment policies and practices 
in MNCs. This thereby leads to systemic differences in the way national business systems 
organize their economic activity through the mechanisms governing the operation of 
capital, labour and product markets and their subsequent impact on MNC’s behavior 
(Ferner et al., 2005). Thus the primary assumption of the institutionalist approach is that 
MNCs will be influenced in their international operations by the structures, operating 
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models, and patterns of thoughts and behavior they have developed in response to the 
business context in which they originate (Whitley, 2001). Specifically, it is claimed that 
country of origin effects influence MNC’s attitudes and approaches to unions and 
collective employee representation (Ferner and Quintanilla, 2008). Accordingly, for 
example, German-owned multinationals tend to exhibit strong firm-based indirect 
representative forms of employee voice conversely to US-owned MNCs which appear to 
prefer direct engagement with employees (Ferner and Varul, 1999). Specifically, studies of 
MNCs in Ireland suggest that many US MNCs engage in union avoidance in order to avoid 
having to take part in collective bargaining, among other reasons (Gunnigle 1995; Gunnigle 
et al., 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, some literature has noted that globalization processes do not have simple 
homogenizing effects: rather they are reshaped, resisted and redeployed by the socially 
embedded processes of the host location, emphasizing country of operation-level 
distinctiveness (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). More specifically it is argued that country of 
operation effects influence the application of MNCs’ employment policies and practices on 
the ground (Almond et al., 2005). In particular, these studies show that even when MNCs 
apply ‘best’ employment practices globally, local adaptation of these practices remains 
necessary. Since employee representation systems are deeply embedded in national 
institutional arrangements, it would be difficult for foreign MNCs to simply transfer home-
country approaches into different national contexts. Rather, as some researchers argue, it 
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seems more plausible that MNC subsidiaries adapt their practices to accommodate local 
context, including national legislation concerning collective bargaining, employee 
representation structures and social rights of information and consultation (Whitley, 2001). 
This work frequently draws a contrast between coordinated market economies (CMEs), 
which have higher levels of regulation and institutionalization of employee representation 
structures and practices, and liberal market economies (LMEs), characterized by lower 
levels of regulation regarding employee representation and works councils’ rights. The 
argument is that the range of employment practices open to firms is more controlled, and 
therefore restricted in subsidiaries operating within CMEs than in LMEs.   
 
Beyond national institutionalism  
Home and host-country claims alone are insufficient to explain the development of 
industrial relations practices within MNCs, not least because of two main reasons reported 
in the literature. Firstly, it is argued that depending on the ‘economic success’ of the 
country of origin, MNCs from that country can more easily transfer their domestic 
management practices abroad (Royle, 2006). This ‘‘economic dominance’ effect may be 
particularly relevant for national economies which are highly reliant on foreign investment 
(Geary and Roche, 2001, Gunnigle et al., 2009). Secondly, a primary concern of 
contemporary institutional accounts concerns isomorphism or hybridization at country 
level. Also known as ‘dual institutional effect’, this concerns the ways in which MNCs 
strategically adapt their practices to take advantage of institutional distance and abandon 
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practices prevalent in their home countries. There is evidence, for example, of German 
MNCs opting to operate in environments where they are not subjected to codetermination 
and works councils (Meardi et al., 2009). On the other hand, MNCs from LMEs may more 
easily view their home practices as a source of competitive advantage and attempt to 
transfer these to host countries (Lamare et al., 2013). Thereby, the ‘dual institutional effect’ 
approach reflects the formal regulatory structures, the manner in which the socialization 
process is framed by nation-specific formal and informal patterns of behavior, and perhaps 
the greater ease of researching within one national context.  
 
From a comparative institutional perspective social actors within MNCs are seen as 
operating between the competing institutional forces exerted by MNC head office at home 
(parent company) as it attempts to transfer policy to the subsidiary, and those forces 
exerted by the host institutional context within which the MNC operates. In addition, 
Whitley (1999) argues that firms within different host institutional contexts may 
demonstrate different ways of dealing with employment and industrial relations 
institutional structures, such as systems of employee representation and collective 
bargaining, which often go beyond the traditional institutional contrast between CMEs and 
LMEs. More specifically, MNCs’ industrial relations practices may be influenced by the 
extent of organizational leeway enjoyed by local actors at subsidiary level. Hence, within the 
context of the home and host institutional factors, MNCs at local level develop their own 
strategy, using their discretion to pursue specific interests and locally negotiating in that 
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respect. For example, Meardi et al. (2009) found that country of origin and country of 
operation effects partly explained the transfer of employment practices in US and German 
multinationals’ subsidiaries in Central and Eastern European countries because of the 
‘contested’ and ‘contingent’ nature of the process of transfer within MNCs. This is for 
different reasons. First of all, MNCs have to negotiate with powerful actors in the local 
environment, such as the unions and their existing structures of employee representation. 
Secondly, actors at different organizational levels may have different interests as well as 
different resources. From a power and interest perspective, the mechanisms through which 
local managers attempt to exercise their autonomy at the subsidiary level can be diverse and 
reflect their organizational interests and local power resources (Ferner et al., 2013). 
Sometimes local management can negotiate a path through various, sometimes 
contradictory, institutional pressures from the home and host environments. Power 
resources may derive from subsidiary’s success and consequent credibility within the wider 
firm, and from the local actors’ ability to exploit the local institutional context. By acting as 
interpreters of the possibilities and limits of the local institutional environment, subsidiary 
actors may lever considerable freedom of action for themselves in the face of institutional 
pressures from headquarters and from the institutional forces of the parent-country 
business system (Ferner et al., 2005). Williams and Geppert (2011) report that German 
management used the argument that works councils would not agree to certain measures in 
order to resist decisions made at corporate level, while preserving their autonomy and 
engaging with works councils to ‘fight for their plants’.  
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Hence, differential degrees of local management autonomy affect how industrial relations 
practices and policies are developed within MNCs. This is because of macro-institutional 
forces may be variably used by local actors at subsidiary level to shape industrial relations 
policy and practice within MNCs. This further denotes the need to attribute particular 
relevance to the level of discretion local MNC actors have in shaping particular 
employment practices and identify the main factors explaining it, and examine how they 
interact within MNCs.  
 
THE INTREPID CONTRIBUTION  
INTREPID comprises a network of international scholars involved in parallel large scale 
surveys of employment practice in MNCs in different national contexts. The principal 
objective is to ensure an accurate, representative depiction of the activities of MNCs, 
especially in the areas of employment practice and industrial relations. The data collected 
are the outcome of the most representative comparative surveys of employment practice in 
MNCs located in the respective countries. The lack of representativeness in previous 
studies of MNCs has been noted by several observers over the years (Edwards at al., 2007; 
McDonnell et al., 2007; Collinson and Rugman, 2010) with particular concern expressed 
regarding particular sample biases. In terms of definition, INTREPID initially distinguished 
between foreign and domestic owned MNCs and established a size threshold as follows:  
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 Foreign-owned MNCs are wholly or majority foreign-owned organisations operating in 
the host country, with 500 or more employees worldwide and 100 or more employed in 
their host country operations.  
 Domestic-owned MNCs are wholly or majority home country-owned organisations 
with 500 or more employees worldwide and at least 100 employed abroad. 
The next phase involved identifying the relevant population of MNCs in each country. The 
compilation of an accurate and comprehensive listing of the population of MNCs proved 
to be a particularly painstaking task requiring a detailed review of various listings of MNCs 
provided by national agencies and organisations specialising in company databases. Full 
details on this process and our overall methodology are outlined in Edwards et al. (2013).  
 
The third (fieldwork) phase required the completion of structured face to face interviews 
with the most senior HR director or manager able to answer for all of the operations in the 
relevant host countryiii. Respondents were asked to report on various aspects of 
organisational structure/characteristics and also on five aspects of employment practice – 
the HR function, pay and performance management, employee representation and 
consultation, employee involvement and communication, and training, development and 
organisation learning. In investigating these areas, information was sought in employment 
practice relating to three specific groups of employees, namely the “largest occupational 
group (LOG)”, “managers” and the “key group”, defined as follows: 
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 LOG: the largest non-managerial occupational group among the employees in the 
MNC’s operations in each country. For example, in a manufacturing business it might 
be semi-skilled operators or in an insurance company it might be call centre staff.  
 Managers: employees who primarily manage the organisation, or a department, 
subdivision, function, or component of the organisation and whose main tasks consist 
of the direction and coordination of the functioning of the organisation. In other 
words, managers are those above the level of first-line supervision. 
 Key group: those employees whom MNCs might identify as critical to the firm’s 
organisational learning and core competence. These might be research staff, product 
designers, major account handlers, developers of new markets, etc.  
 
Surveys were completed in the ‘first wave’ countries (Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK) 
between 2006 and 2008, while surveys in the ‘second wave’ countries (Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Denmark, Mexico and Norway) were undertaken later, and some were just 
completed in 2013. 
 
Since completion of the first wave country surveys, a quantum of published work using 
INTREPID data has emerged. Not of all of this has focused on industrial relations though 
much has. Arguably the most significant industrial relations contribution from first wave 
INTREPID data was captured in the special issue of Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
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entitled “Cross-National Perspectives on Multinational Companies and Employment 
Relations” (volume 66, number 3, 2013). In the following two sections we review the 
published literature on INTREPID data to date in the field and its contribution to 
enhancing our understanding of industrial relations in MNCs.   
 
Employee Voice and MNCs   
 
a) Institutional (macro) level effects on employee voice 
In line with our earlier discussion, much of the relevant published work has placed 
particular emphasis on how institutional context in the country of origin informs MNC 
approaches to employee voice (cf. Lavelle, 2008; Gunnigle et al., 2009; Marginson et al., 
2010; Gooderham et al., 2011; Minbaeva and Navrbjerg, 2011, Edwards et al., 2012; 
Marginson et al., 2013). The use of direct and indirect employee voice along with the 
incidence of hybrid or dualistic systems has been investigated through an approach that 
uses, and seeks to go beyond, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) lens (Lamare et al., 2013). 
To some extent, the evidence has corroborated some expectations that a VoC approach 
generates, such as the ingrained tendency of US MNCs for union avoidance and the use of 
direct mechanisms of employee voice in their Canadian, British and Irish subsidiaries. 
Similar findings were statistically supported by Lavelle et al. (2010) in their study of 
employee voice in MNCs with operations in Ireland. Lamare et al. (2013: 713), in exploring 
variations among MNCs based in Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom, note that 
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‘within LME host environments, US subsidiaries differ in terms of trade union status when 
compared against those from other home countries, particularly, CMEs’. They found that 
union presence in German, Nordic, British and other European-owned MNCs operating in 
the three LME nations studied was higher than the levels of unionization in US MNCs.  
 
However, some of the expectations generated by a VoC approach were not supported. For 
instance, Nordic and Japanese-owned MNCs, despite their origins in quite different forms 
of capitalism, were not significantly different from their US counterparts (Marginson et al., 
2010; Lamare et al., 2013). Moreover, double-breasting, defined as the simultaneous 
operation of unionised and non-unionised sites (Gunnigle et al., 2009), was found to be 
especially characteristic of Nordic and US-owned MNC subsidiaries despite the marked 
differences in the institutions of the countries of origin (Lamare et al., 2013). One 
interpretation of these findings is that they suggest that MNCs may be implementing 
employee voice arrangements similar to the ‘dominant’ group of US firms (Ferner and 
Varul, 1999). The idea that ‘dominance’ effects are evident in MNCs approaches to 
employee voice appears to be particularly strong in countries that are heavily reliant on FDI 
inflows. Lamare et al (2013) highlight the particular case of US MNCs in Ireland, which 
account for over sixty per cent of FDI. In line with this, high levels of union avoidance 
were reported among MNCs operating in Ireland due largely to the disproportionate 
number of US MNCs there, but also possibly accentuated by Ireland’s comparatively 
permissive industrial relations system. Union avoidance was especially evident in new sites 
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opened by MNC subsidiaries (Marginson et al., 2010; Lamare et al., 2013). These scholars 
note that union avoidance in US MNCs does not only imply a growing presence of direct 
employee voice but also an increase of non-union employee representation structures such 
as work councils or consultative committees.  
 
b) Organizational (micro) effects on employee voice 
A longstanding focus on institutional context has traditionally characterised the literature 
on employee voice in MNC subsidiaries with the consequence that scholars have often 
relegated micro-level effects to the background. Often treated as variables of control, the 
relevance of firm-specific characteristics is now gaining ground in explaining variation in 
industrial relations (Marginson et al., 2010; Bechter et al., 2012), and employee voice in 
particular (Lavelle et al., 2010; Marginson et al., 2010; Edwards et al., 2012; Lamare et al., 
2013). INTREPID scholars have been to the fore in moving beyond analyses of the impact 
of institutional factors and thus shedding light on other explanatory factors that may hold 
greater power in explaining differing approaches to employee voice in MNCs.  
 
Firstly, there seems to be a growing consensus on the influence of sector of operations. In 
this regard, MNCs in the manufacturing sector were more likely to adopt indirect voice 
approaches and were generally characterised by comparatively high levels of unionisation 
(Marginson et al., 2010; Lamare et al., 2013). In contrast, MNCs in the services sector were 
more likely to present hybrid or dualistic approaches, combining direct and indirect 
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employee voice methods. Digging more deeply, MNCs operating in financial/professional 
services, retail, wholesale, distribution and hospitality appear more likely to adopt 
minimalistic approaches to employee voice, i.e. adopt none or very few employee voice 
channels. However, where some form of employee voice is adopted by MNCs in these 
sectors, hybrid or dualistic approaches appear most common (Lavelle et al., 2010). Second, 
product diversification appears to be significant in explaining different approaches to 
employee voice, particularly in regard to double-breasting. MNCs characterised by a high 
level of product diversification are more likely to report union avoidance via double-
breasting than MNCs with a more standardised product portfolio (Lamare et al., 2013). 
Lamare et al. (2013) show that double-breasting approaches are more common among 
diversified MNCs than among those with a single product. The interpretation of this seems 
to be that product diversification entails a variety of production lines and thus different 
employee groupings in each product line, and that this in turn results in the adoption of 
different employee voice approaches within such MNCs as management deal with each 
group differently according to their employment characteristics and union status. Third, 
MNCs that had recently acquired (‘brownfield’) sites, were more likely to combine hybrid 
approaches than MNCs which had opened greenfield sites or had not recently engaged in 
new investments (Gunnigle et al., 2009; Marginson et al., 2010).  
 
Subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations 
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As we have seen above, scholarly inquiry on the latitude of subsidiary level management to 
articulate and develop their own employment practices is important for two primary 
reasons. Firstly, the exploration of subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations is a road 
comparatively less travelled (Collings, 2008). As Belizón et al. (2014: 6) note “despite the 
extensive literature examining subsidiary autonomy over a broad range of HR practices, 
there has been far less research with a specific focus on industrial relations matters”. 
Secondly, the extent of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations is likely to be 
particularly sensitive to local institutional arrangements, probably more so that other 
employment practices such as performance management or training and development 
(Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). This makes comparative analysis across different national 
contexts particularly interesting. This gap in knowledge concerning variation in subsidiary 
autonomy has been identified by INTREPID scholars at a macro- and micro level of 
analysis.   
 
a) Institutional (macro) factors shaping subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations 
Drawing from past contributions on subsidiary autonomy over HRM practices, there 
appears to be a well-established pattern in US MNCs. Such firms normally allow limited 
scope for local managers in regard to HR practices (Almond et al., 2005; Almond and 
Ferner, 2006). In the industrial relations sphere, recent work using INTREPID data found 
that US MNCs afford subsidiaries located in Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK lower 
levels of autonomy when compared to their European and Asian counterparts (Ferner et 
18 
 
al., 2011; Ferner et al., 2013; Bélanger et al., 2013; Belizón et al., 2014). Equally, host 
country effects remain an important factor in attempts to reveal how macro-settings in the 
country of operation impact on subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations (Almond and 
Ferner, 2006). MNC subsidiaries operating in more highly regulated labour market regimes 
such as Mediterranean countries (e.g. Spain) report higher levels of subsidiary autonomy 
than subsidiaries operating in more permissive regimes such as the UK, Ireland and 
Canada, where wider institutional leeway is granted to MNCs (Ferner et al., 2011; Bélanger 
et al., 2013; Belizón et al., 2014). Within more highly regulated regimes, this is normally 
attributed to the necessity to conform to specific local regulation and legal requirements 
(Marginson et al., 2010), while in more permissive systems MNCs can exercise greater 
strategic freedom to adopt practices originating in the country of origin or which are 
considered to be ‘best practice’ internationally (Gunnigle et al., 2009; Belizón et al., 2014). 
These findings are more or less in line with what one would expect, but the INTREPID 
contribution has not only been to demonstrate these patterns but also to show how they 
are mediated by organizational level factors. 
    
b) Organizational (micro) factors shaping subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations 
Much of the research effort of INTREPID scholars has focused on the impact of 
organizational factors over subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations. At this micro-level, 
substantial contributions have been made on two fronts: subsidiary characteristics and the 
deployment of international HR/IR structures.  
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Regarding subsidiary characteristics, we earlier noted how sector of operations constitutes a 
valuable explanatory factor in accounting for variation in management approaches to 
employee voice. First, we find that manufacturing MNCs are more likely to afford higher 
levels of autonomy (Ferner et al., 2011; Belizón et al., 2014). This is most likely related to 
the higher levels of unionisation in manufacturing and the related predisposition of such 
MNCs to rely on indirect employee voice approaches (Lamare et al., 2013). Second, mode 
of entry appears to impact on MNCs’ capacity to implement managerial practices that 
originated in the country of origin or alternatively. MNCs establishing their operations 
through greenfield sites do not encounter pre-established workforce management 
traditions as might be the case in operations established via mergers or acquisitions. 
Consequently, greenfield sites facilitate greater opportunity to follow corporate preference 
in industrial relations. Accordingly, INTREPID scholars have identified a pronounced 
tendency towards union avoidance in subsidiaries established at greenfield sites (Gunnigle 
et al., 2009). Third, a similar tendency was identified regarding the trajectory of new 
investments in the country of operation. INTREPID data provide evidence to suggest that 
establishment of new sites is significantly associated with lower levels of subsidiary 
autonomy over industrial relations practices (Gunnigle et al., 2009; Belizón et al., 2014). 
Arguably, the rationale behind this relationship may spring from the fact that new 
investments are generally undertaken under corporate guidelines and financial support and 
thus are more exposed to central control (Tempel et al., 2006). Fourth, the extent of 
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product or service diversification also has practical consequences for subsidiary autonomy. 
It seems that the greater the extent of diversification, the greater the extent of subsidiary 
autonomy (Ferner et al., 2011). As argued in relation to employee voice above, 
diversification of products or services generally entails a more heterogeneous workforce 
(e.g. every product line could be served by a different profile of employee such as skilled, 
unskilled, etc.) which carries the need for MNCs to conform to both local regulatory 
requirements and the differing demands from different groups of employees. Diversified 
MNCs report, therefore, higher levels of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations, 
arguably granted to allow local managers scope to deal with the needs of different groups 
of employees (Ferner et al., 2011; Pulignano et al., 2013).  
 
A further micro-level factor that appears to be crucial in explaining variation in subsidiary 
autonomy is subsidiary capabilities. As Bélanger et al. (2013) observe: “organizational 
capabilities are seen to be a key pillar for subsidiaries to gain space for decision-making 
within the MNC”. The influence of the power interplays between subsidiaries and HQ at a 
micro-level has been generally neglected in previous work and consequently studies of the 
effect of subsidiary capabilities on the level of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations 
constitute an important step forward in attempts to move beyond institutions in explaining 
variation in industrial relations in MNCs. Prominent scholars posit that subsidiaries do not 
necessarily occupy weak and vulnerable positions but rather may garner power in their 
dealings with HQ (Ferner et al., 2012). Bélanger et al. (2013) identify two different 
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subsidiary capabilities that account for variation in the level of subsidiary autonomy, 
namely, internal management capabilities and the extent of embeddedness of MNC 
subsidiaries in the local economy. The former “reflects the ability of local managers to 
develop positive relationships with the employees to foster innovation and to represent 
favourably the subsidiary within the broader structures of the firm. Such social resources 
are likely to promote investment in the subsidiary and secure more strategic mandates from 
headquarters” (Bélanger et al., 2013; 325). This work establishes a positive correlation 
between the strength of these subsidiary capabilities and higher levels of subsidiary 
autonomy in industrial relations. They also found that where MNCs were strongly 
embedded in the local economy then subsidiaries are more likely to enjoy a greater 
subsidiary autonomy. Subsidiary embeddedness within the local economy was measured 
through the extent subsidiaries engage with their local institutional arena by establishing 
alliances with, for example, universities to undertake relevant research or by using different 
public services such as funding for new investments offered by local entities (Murray et al., 
2014). Thus the ability of actors at subsidiary level to generate competencies from their 
immediate context outside the firm shapes their relations with managers at higher levels 
within the firm.  
 
Also within the micro-sphere, INTREPID researchers have investigated the impact of 
international HR/IR structures on subsidiary autonomy (Ferner et al., 2011; Belizón et al., 
2014). While personal control exercised by expatriates from headquarters or third countries 
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is related to low levels of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations (Belizón et al., 
2014), the deployment of various international HR structures seems to have no discernible 
impact on the extent of autonomy enjoyed by local managers in MNCs (Ferner et al., 2011; 
Belizón et al., 2014). In practical terms, this means that variations in the level of subsidiary 
autonomy in industrial relations appear detached from the use of international HR 
structures, such as the presence of an international committee acting as a policy-making 
body to develop and disseminate HRM practice across borders, the use of human 
resources information systems (HRIS), the incidence of direct and regular reporting from 
subsidiary to HQ on HR/IR issues and the use of a shared service centre for HR. These 
international structures have proven to limit the level of subsidiary autonomy over other 
HR practices (Ferner et al., 2011; Belizón et al., 2013). However, IR practices seem to 
follow their own path. This is in line Ferner et al. (2011) who argue that industrial relations 
practice, because of its local nature, are not as dependent on corporate strategies and 
structures as other areas of HR practice.  
 
CHARTING A FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA  
As illustrated above, considerable insights have been gleaned on the autonomy enjoyed by 
MNCs subsidiary level management in their interaction with local unions and systems of 
collective representation. The factors shaping subsidiary autonomy at both institutional 
(macro) and organizational micro-level have been widely identified by the INTREPID 
network. Yet much remains to be done, not least the need for more extensive and 
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comparative analyses of the power interplays or interaction between institutional- (home 
and host county effects) and firm-level organisational and structural factors impacting 
subsidiary level autonomy.  
 
Of particular interest is how organisational (micro) level features mediate the extent of 
subsidiary level management discretion over employee representative engagement within 
MNCs. We have seen above reference to initial INTREPID work in this sphere. There is 
clearly room for some replication using the broader spectrum of ‘wave two’ countries 
which also provide scope for a regional focus. For example, it should be possible to 
compare these effects and measure their relative influence in MNC subsidiaries in six the 
European countries involved, namely Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Spain and the 
UK. In so doing, scholars might assess the effects of the above factors (independent 
variables) on trade union status and engagement. This would help advance understanding 
on how a wide range of factors influence both employee representation status and the 
extent of management discretion over collective representation.  
 
As noted earlier different types of MNCs operate in different institutional contexts and one 
way of categorising them is by country of origin or ownership. Again the addition of 
second wave countries provides the potential to explore variation amongst and within 
CME and LME market economies as identified by the VoC approach (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). The Nordic countries, categorized as CMEs, and exemplified by Denmark and 
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Norway in INTREPID, are arguably different from Germany, for instance, where the 
industrial relations system has a stronger legislative basis. Even within Nordic countries 
there may be differences between employment regimes, e.g. Denmark’s use of more liberal 
approaches such as of ‘flexicurity’ (Gooderham et al., 2011).  
 
Future research could further profile the impact of sub-national governance systems, such 
as geographical regions (e.g. federal states), which often split jurisdiction over industrial 
relations issues, thus potentially inducing within-country variations in labour market 
regulation. In this regard, INTREPID now incorporates ‘second wave’ countries with such 
a federal structure, such as Belgium. Recent work in this area has highlighted the 
importance of the sub-national level in shaping management practices within MNCs (cf. 
Almond, 2011). However, most studies are qualitative and lack the capacity to assess the 
degree of variation (if any) on a sub-national level. Furthermore, a focus on within and 
across country variation will allow scholars assess the extent to which factors that influence 
employee representation and local management discretion differ across diverse industrial 
relations systems. This is particularly relevant in the light of Hyman’s (2009: 10) 
observation regarding the inadequate way in which scholars have responded so far to the 
dilemma of comparative research. As we have seen, comparative analysis in industrial 
relations is fraught with difficulty since national business and industrial relations systems 
generally differ in key respects, rendering each quite contextually bound and, in many 
respects, unique (cf. Edwards et al, 2013, Crouch, 2005). As Hyman (2009: 9-10) argues, 
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reducing complexity and variety by elaborating different typologies or models, and thereby 
engaging in ‘typification’ carries the disadvantage of reducing “… diversity to a limited 
number of ‘models’ or ideal types and (supressing the) … more complex aspects of 
differentiation”. He also concedes that while this approach has the potential to effectively 
illustrate how economies can be shaped and operate according to different institutional 
logics, it also risks ‘over-simplification’ by identifying ideal-typical country groupings based 
on particular characteristics, which may be shared to a differential degree by countries so-
categorised. This may prove a fruitful avenue for INTREPID scholars. In particular, 
because multiple determinants are at work, researchers interested in understanding the 
dynamics affecting the development of industrial relations practices within MNCs need to 
move away from over simplification of national economy types, and embrace the complex 
interface of power interplay between macro-institutional and micro-organisational effects 
within MNCs.  
 
Two particular lines of inquiry deal with different dimensions of context. First is the impact 
of sector, discussed above. Here INTREPID scholars might take up the challenge 
identified by Bechter et al. (2012: 185) that “industrial relations vary across sectors as 
deeply as they do across countries”. This might be achieved by more in-depth analysis of 
sector and sub-sector variation. Earlier we noted differences between manufacturing and 
service sector MNCs. However this is arguably too crude a level of analysis and more 
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specific sectoral categorisations such as European industrial activity classification (NACE codes) 
might be used in future work. This may need to be done on a comparative (cross-country) 
basis to garner adequate numbers of MNCs in each sectoral cell. A second important but 
somewhat problematic focus of future inquiry is the impact of the global financial crisis 
(GFC) on MNCs and industrial relations therein. A key challenge relates to variation in the 
timing of surveys. In the ‘first wave’ countries surveys were undertaken between 2006 and 
2008, while this work was undertaken in ‘second wave’ countries much later, mostly in the 
period 2010-2013. This is not unusual in comparative research of this nature (Edwards et 
al., 2013), especially in surveys such as INTREPID which address phenomena that do not 
change quickly. Work to date on the impact of the GFC has been largely qualitative in 
nature (cf. Gunnigle et al., 2013) and generally lacking in comparative focus, thus providing 
at least the possibility for greater quantitative analyses as might be undertaken using 
INTREPID data. 
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ii
 INTREPID comprises a network of international scholars involved in parallel surveys of employment 
practices in multinational companies (MNCs) across different national contexts. These surveys were 
initially conducted in Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK and were the most representative investigations 
of their kind in these countries. Subsequent surveys were conducted in ‘second wave’ countries, namely 
Argentina Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Mexico and Norway. For a detailed overview of the 
methodology employed see Edwards et al, 2013, and for additional information on each country see 
Novick et al (2011) on Argentina; McDonnell et al (2011) on Australia; Minbaeva & Navrbjerg (2011) on 
Denmark; McDonnell et al (2007) and Lavelle et al (2009) on Ireland; Carrillo & Gomis (2014) on Mexico; 
Quintanilla et al (2010) on Spain; Steen (2010) on Norway and Edwards et al (2007) on the UK. Data 
collection in Belgium is near completion.  
 
iii
 Face to face interviews were not conducted in Canada, Denmark and Norway where respondents were 
required to complete the questionnaire in either hard copy or on-line. This was supplemented by a small 
number of qualitative interviews (cf. Edwards et al, 2013 & relevant country reports). 
